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Abstract
The causal links between growth, human development and institu-
tions are central to understanding the long-run development process.
The turn of the millennium has seen influential research in develop-
ment economics attempting to uncover some of these links, but a
focus on root-causes of growth has limited its insights in both scope
and method. This paper provides a fresh analysis of the interdepen-
dence of growth, human development and institutions using a gen-
eral equilibrium framework. The framework is tested using 4 dif-
ferent cross-sectional and panel-data specifications including data
from 1820>. Findings implicate that both growth and human de-
velopment, but also human development and institutional progress
strongly depend on each other in the long run. The results imply
the existence of significant general-equilibrium effects shaping the
long-run trajectories of countries. These mechanisms defy overly
deterministic views of development, and invite careful further study.
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Introduction
The existing empirical literature on institutions, human de-
velopment (HD) (or human capital (HC)) and economic
growth (EG), can be partitioned into four separate camps.
The first of these groups is the geographic determinist or
endowment camp associated with studies such as Sachs and
Warner (1995, 1997), Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Sachs
(2003). These studies assert that geographic factors such
as tropics, germs, and crops have a direct and fundamen-
tal effect on economic development and can explain a good
part of the international development divide. Bloom et al.
(1998) for example hold that the high disease burden in
Africa negatively impacts productivity, investment and sav-
ing, and therefore impairs African economic performance.
They empirically find that the high incidence of malaria re-
duces the annual growth rate of the continent by 1,3%, and
that an eradication of malaria in the 1950’s would have dou-
bled income per capita today.
The institutionalists, associated with studies such as Hall
& Jones (1999); Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2014) and Rodrik
et al. (2004), believe that early (colonial) institutions and
subsequent institutional developments lie at the heart of the
development divide (Vieira et al., 2012). These authors af-
firm the effects of geography, the disease burden and HD
on economic development, but rather assert that these fac-
tors have as their root cause extractive and ineffective insti-
tutions which were put in place by the activities of European
settlers during the colonial era. Acemoglu et al. (2001) use
data on the mortality rates of European settlers in different
parts of the world to instrument for their measure of institu-
tions, and show a robust positive effect of institutions on EG.
They assume that European settlers set up "extractive states,"
(e.g. Belgian Congo) when climactic conditions were un-
favourable and the disease burden high, and settler colonies
(e.g. Australia and the USA) where the climate and the dis-
ease environment were more favourable (Acemoglu et al.,
2001). This leads to the following identification mechanism:
SETTLER MORTALITY⇒ SETTLEMENTS⇒ EARLY INSTITUTIONS⇒
CURRENT INSTITUTIONS⇒ CURRENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.
The third group of studies in this literature express the so
called policy view. These authors hold that good macroeco-
nomic policies, openness to international trade, and financial
integration into capital markets are the fundamental drivers
of long-run economic success (Vieira et al., 2012). Repre-
sentative studies are the ones by Frankel & Romer (1999)
and Dollar & Kraay (2003). These studies have tried to
identify the effects of trade on income by exploiting deep
geographical determinants of trade such as landlockedness
and remoteness from major markets. Dollar & Kraay (2003)
find that trade has the largest effect on EG in the short run.
A final set of studies is in support of the HD (HC) view.
These authors hold the modernization view by Lipset (1960)
that HD is a more basic source of growth than institutions,
and that poor countries get out of poverty through good
policies, often pursued by dictators, which lead to an accu-
mulation of human and physical capital, and subsequently to
improvement of political institutions (Glaeser et al., 2004).
In support of their view they recite the experiences of Asian
nations such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, which
first grew rapidly under one-party dictatorships and even-
tually became democratic. In policy considerations these
authors hold that establishing democracies in countries with
low human capital might not be viable strategy, development
efforts should be directed towards improving human capital.
Next to these distinct camps and the vigorous debates
among one another, few studies have presented new ideas.
Bhattacharyya (2009) tries to marry the institutionalist to
the disease view by promoting a stage theory where dis-
eases are more important at early stages of development and
institutions take primacy once growth has embarked. Two
studies, Ranis et al. (2000) and Suri et al. (2011), have at-
tempted in estimating a dynamic cycle between EG and HD.
Using cross-country regressions they demonstrate a signifi-
cant relationship in both directions. They also investigate the
development paths of countries over time which they catego-
rize into "virtuous" and "vicious" cycles, and establish that in
terms of sequencing HD appears to be a more fundamental
driver than EG (Ranis et al., 2000).
The source of the fascination that this literature in its ef-
fort to disentangle the root causes of development has exerted
on the wider economics profession is thereby also the source
of it’s greatest weakness: The picture of long-term develop-
ment emerging from it is highly deterministic. A central is-
sue with the results of the 4 camps is that in estimating single
equations, they have produced partial equilibrium estimates
that take neither feedback loops from the dependent variable
(per capita income in most cases) to the independent vari-
ables (institutions, HD etc.), nor relationships between pre-
dictor variables into account. Development is treated as a lin-
ear growth focused process with very limited room for inter-
action. Ranis et al. (2000) have provided important progress
in terms of modelling, but in treating institutions as exoge-
nous and refraining from the use of rigorous empirical iden-
tification methods, they leave large room for improvement.
Theoretical Model
This paper addresses these conceptual and methodological
shortcomings by building and testing a general equilibrium
model of development focusing on the interactions of growth,
human development and institutions. The model builds on
the model of Ranis et al. (2000) but endogenizes institu-
tions. It’s central theoretical contribution is the conceptual-
ization of macro development as a long-run equilibrium pro-
cess characterized by an equilibrium path subject to exoge-
nous shocks. The aim of the modelling thereby was to build
a generic "IS-LM" type model of development, combining
simple theoretical assumptions with rigorous empirical ef-
forts to identify the model, which may be expanded upon in
further research. The research question may thus read: "How
strong are the long-term links between EG, HD and institu-
tions, and what do they imply for future macro development
research"? The model is shown graphically in Fig. 1. It
comprises of 6 chains which are described in this section.
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Economic Growth and Human Development
Income directly influences HD1 by advancing the economy’s
command over resources and therefore the individuals abil-
ity to undertake private health and education expenditures
(Ranis, 2004). Central mediators for how effective income
translates into HD via private expenditure are the income
distribution, the structure of the economy, and cultural fac-
tors such as gender equality (Ranis, 2004; Ranis et al., 2000).
HD also impacts EG and income. Following Amartya Sen,
healthier, more educated, and therefore more capable people
can choose from a broader variety of possible functioning’s
and are therefore more likely to find an occupation in which
they are most productive (Sen, 1985). Health and education
also strongly interact and enter the production function di-
rectly by their contribution to what the literature has termed
"human capital". HC for its part is strongly related to labour
productivity and scientific progress, but also to the quality
of private investment and economic management. Decreased
fertility rates, greater investment in children’s education and
increased equality are further positive externalities of HD.
All of the above factors then translate either directly or prox-
imately (e.g. via technological progress) into EG.
Institutions and Human Development
Institutions impact HD through government expenditures on
health and education, social services and family-support,
pension systems and more generally their success in levelling
the income distribution and creating an equal-opportunities
environment. The effectiveness of government social expen-
ditures in advancing HD, depends on the quality of govern-
ment expenditure targeting and delivery, which in turn highly
depends on its structure (Ranis, 2004). Governments must
however also have the institutional capacity to efficiently al-
locate these expenditures. This capacity, for the most part,
is found in the education of its public servants. Education
is fundamental to running government institutions such as
courts or parliaments, and for ordinary citizens to engage
with the polity. Literacy and public press were character-
istic of early modern societies and increased the general pub-
lic attention to political matters (Glaeser et al., 2004). As an
early proponent, Lipset (1960) holds that educated people are
more likely to resolve their differences through negotiation
and voting instead of violent conflict. These aspects together
constitute what was termed "political capital" in Fig. 1.
1Defined here reductionistic as health and education.
Institutions and Economic Growth
Countries with better institutions are characterized by and in-
dependent judiciary and the enforcement of property rights
and contracts. They encourage investment (domestic or for-
eign) in machinery, R&D, human capital and technology, all
of which promote growth. Other important channels further-
ing EG are public research and development expenditure,
and the quality of economic and trade policy. For the re-
verse chain from income to institutional quality, it is evident
that increased incomes enhance the possibilities of govern-
ments in terms of taxation, public expenditure and invest-
ment (Ranis, 2004). A second mechanism is the natural de-
mand posed by rising and changing levels of economic ac-
tivity for different forms of social organization and regula-
tion. This effect, termed "complexity demands" in Fig. 1,
goes back to Walter Rostow’s stages of economic develop-
ment and the experience of countries during the industrial
revolution. Bhattacharyya (2009) elaborates further upon the
impact that moving past subsistence levels of production has
on the organization of society and political institutions.
Empirical Strategy
The theoretical model is estimated using a cross-sectional
and three panel-data specifications. To represent the cen-
tral constructs of interest, the logarithm of GDP per capita
2011 PPP $ (LGDPC) is taken for income/EG, for HD the
non-income HDI (NIHDI) is computed following UNDP’s
technical notes, and for Institutions a multidimensional in-
stitutions index (MII) is computed from various institutional
indicators. The latter can be broadly split into political sys-
tem variables (e.g. from organizations like Freedom House)
and governance outcome measures (e.g. the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators of the World Bank)2.
Cross-Section with 2005 as Base-Year
In the cross-section, data on 181 countries in 2005 is used.
The theoretical model is operationalized in form of a 3-
equation simultaneous equation system (SEM) as shown in
Eq. 1, and the SEM is identified using two-stage least squares
Income = βo+β1Institutions+β2Human Development+ ctr.+ ε
Human Development = β3 +β4Income+β5Institutions+ ctr.+ ε
Institutions = β6 +β7Human Development+β8Income+ ctr.+ ε
(1)
(2SLS) under limited-information maximum likelihood es-
timation with heteroskedasticity robust errors. The instru-
ments used to identify the SEM are taken from the literature
and summarized in Tab. 1. For income, two own instruments
TABLE 1: CROSS-SECTION 2005: INSTRUMENTS
Instrument Source Used for
Primary enrolment in 1900 Acemoglu et al. (2014) NIHDI
Protestant missionaries per 10,000 people in the 1920’s Acemoglu et al. (2014) NIHDI
Dummy=1 if protmiss computed from Dennis et al. Acemoglu et al. (2014) NIHDI
Malaria Ecology, pop-weighted Sachs (2003) NIHDI
Log settler mortality, mortality capped at 250 Acemoglu et al. (2014) MII
Log population density 1500 (baseline) Acemoglu et al. (2014) MII
Share of the population that speaks English Dollar & Kraay (2003) MII
Share of Pop. that speaks a major European language Dollar & Kraay (2003) MII
Legal Origin La Porta et al. (1999) MII
(Avg<2005) FDI % of GDP undet. by H.C. & Inst. WDI / Authors Calc. LGDPC
(Avg<2005) Net oil export value/capita, const. 2000 $ WDI / Authors Calc. LGDPC
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were computed: 1. the residuals of a regression of FDI on
various HD and institutional variables, and 2. the net oil
export value per capita. Both are averaged over all available
years up to 2005. For each equation in (1), 24 specifications
are estimated using different instrument subsets and various
sets of control variables relating to geography, agriculture,
population, fractionalization, religion, war/conflict, climate,
diseases , culture, colonial history and globalization/trade.
Decadal Averages 1960-2010 with External Instruments
In this second strategy data for around 104 countries is com-
puted as decadal averages from 1960-2010 (5 time-periods),
and an identification strategy using time-varying external in-
struments is followed to estimate (1). These instruments are
TABLE 2: DEC. AV. PANEL 1960-2010: INSTRUMENTS
Instrument Source Used for
Constant price of oil in 2000 $/brl Worldbank WDI LGDPC
Constant price of gas in 2000 $/mboe Worldbank WDI LGDPC
Financial Crisis Dummy (1=Crisis) WDI / Authors Calc. LGDPC/MII
Oil production in metric tons per Capita WDI / Authors Calc. LGDPC
Biol. Disaster (Epidemic etc.) Occurrence EM-DAT at CRED NIHDI
Biol. Disaster (Epidemic etc.) Total Deaths EM-DAT at CRED NIHDI
Biol. Disaster (Epidemic etc.) Total Affected EM-DAT at CRED NIHDI
Number of Revolutions CNTS Data Archive MII
Number of Coups d’Etat CNTS Data Archive MII
Number of Major Constitutional Changes CNTS Data Archive MII
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shown in Tab. 2 and represent plausibly exogenous shocks
impacting the endogenous variables of interest. For each
equation in (1), 12 specifications are estimated using 4 dif-
ferent estimators and time-varying controls relating to con-
flict, population development, weather, agriculture and trade.
The 4 estimators are (I) a first-difference 2SLS (FD-2SLS)
estimator (II) a fixed-effects 2SLS (FE-2SLS) estimator (III)
a one-step difference generalized method of moments (1s
D-GMM) estimator and (IV) a two-step system generalized
method of moments (2s S-GMM) estimator. All 4 include
time-fixed effects, and the error matrix is cluster-robust.
5-Year Averages 1945-2010 with Lags as Instruments
In addition to the previous strategies using external instru-
ments, a 5-year panel using lagged values as instruments is
estimated. The same 4 estimators (I-IV) are employed. For
the FD-2SLS and the FE-2SLS estimators lagged levels 1-5
of the endogenous variables in (1) are used as instruments.
For the 1s D-GMM and the FD equation of the 2s S-GMM
lagged levels 2-5 are used, whereas lagged differences 1-5
are used to instrument the levels equation of the 2s S-GMM
estimator. The same control variables as in the previous strat-
egy are employed, and for each equation in (1), 8 models (the
4 estimators with and without controls) are estimated.
Decadal Averages 1820-2010 with Lags as Instruments
At last, a long term panel with decadal average data for 109
countries reaching down to 1820 is estimated. The data here-
fore was obtained from the Gapminder Foundation and the
Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). Identifi-
cation is achieved using lagged values as instruments in the
same manor as in the previous strategy. In contrast to the pre-
vious strategy, the maximum lag value is set at 4 (e.g. lags
1-4 or 2-4 are used), and no control variables are available
over this long time-frame. For every equation in (1) thus
only 4 models (the 4 estimators I-IV) are estimated.
2For the construction of indexes and empirical details consult the original paper.
To enhance interpretation, the NIHDI is scaled by 10 and the MII scale is 0-10.
Results
The results from all 4 estimation strategies are summarized
in Tab. 3. The reported coefficients are qualitative averages
over the different specifications (instruments and controls).
TABLE 3: EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM 4 STRATEGIES
Chain in Figure 1 (6) (2) (1) (3) (4) (5)
β in Equation 1 β1 β2 β4 β5 β7 β8
Cross-Section (2005) 0.25 0.5 0.65 0.45 0.9 (?) ?(0.1)?
Decadal Panel (1960-2010) 0.1 (?) 0.5 0.65 0.3 0.6 (?) ??
5-Year Panel (1945-2010) 0.06 (?) 0.35 0.73 0.1 0.63 ?(0.05)?
Long Panel (1820-2000) 0.08 (?) 0.45 0.71 0.11 0.66 ??
NOTE: A (?) indicates that there was some variation among significant coefficients in different specifications (different
choices of controls or instruments). ?(...)? indicates that few coefficients were significant at the 5% level, and ??
indicates that no coefficient was significant at all (the effect is to small to be determined or identification failure).
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An additional qualitative overall average result is presented
visually in Fig. 2. The results show a large and very robust
FIGURE 2: RESULTS
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two-way relationship between EG and HD, and also a large
and considerably robust relationship between HD and Insti-
tutions. The relationship between EG/income and institu-
tions proved difficult to establish empirically. The channel
from institutions to income was large in the cross-section but
became significantly smaller in the panel-data models. The
channel from EG to institutional change was hard to detect at
all (possibly also due to weak instruments for this effect).
Discussion & Conclusion
The findings produced in this paper show that applying gen-
eral equilibrium modelling to the macro development context
is a fruitful exercise. The results of all specifications reveal
the presence of significant feedback loops and interactions
between income, human development and institutional qual-
ity, and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients signifies
that these relationships are formative, rather than secondary,
to the long-term development process. The cross-sectional
analysis also confirmed the impact of deep geographical and
historical influences impacting all of the endogenous vari-
ables in this theory. The findings however implicate that the
development process is far more dynamic and far less deter-
ministic than the literature (e.g. the findings of Acemoglu et
al. (2001) and others) implies. This purports that the focus
on root causes and use of linear equations in the literature
is likely to be of limited value when it comes to learning
about development. More research efforts should be devoted
to understanding long-term development mechanisms using
structural general equilibrium models.
Further investigations of the data have revealed that EG
and HD move very closely together, and confirmed the find-
ings of Ranis et al. (2000) that in terms of sequencing HD
improvement tends to precede EG. The data however also
reveal that institutions are empirically not quite on equal
footing with EG and HD. Institutions are more persistent
than HD and income levels, and improve slower. This is also
evident in the time frame under study: Whereas around 1820
income and HD levels were similarly low on all continents,
there already existed greater divergences in the quality of
governance. Table 3 testifies to this in that the cross-section
(which is thought of as considering the outcome of a 500+
year development process) picked up large and very signif-
icant effects of institutions on income, institutions on HD
and HD on institutions. These effects become smaller in
the panel-data models where 5 or 10-year changes are con-
sidered, whereas the two-way relationship between EG and
HD does not change under the shift from cross-sectional to
panel-data. The data also show significant correlations be-
tween levels of institutional quality and the growth rates of
income and HD. These demand further investigation.
If this research were taken as a guide to international pol-
icy making, it would suggest that investments in HD have
the greatest long term returns since HD significantly impacts
both EG and institutions, which in turn feed-back into fur-
ther improvements in HD. Aside from possible direct policy
considerations however the more important message of this
paper is that general equilibrium effects play a central role
in the long-run development process and need to be given
more theoretical and empirical attention. If future macro de-
velopment and political economy research is to present itself
relevant to contemporary policy options, more theoretically
founded structural general equilibrium modelling and think-
ing (possibly inspired by macro, DSGE etc.) is necessary. A
positive externality of such a turn would be the increased ef-
forts devoted to building stronger theoretical foundations in
development economics that have long been called for.
Role of Student
This research was theoretically developed and empirically executed
by myself (Sebastian Krantz), under supervision and helpful com-
ments by my supervisor Dr. Alexei Karas.
NOTE: This paper summarizes my honours thesis in economics. The original work
(23.000 words) and supplementary materials (datasets & code files for STATA and R)
can be accessed here. The findings can be fully reproduced using these materials.
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